The focus on Burma today centers on the National Convention which was reconvened on 5 December 2005. People want to know if this process can be used to bring about democratic change. Given the frustration over the absence of any other political alternatives, some are advocating that we embrace the National Convention and work within the limited confines it seems to afford. Is this a possible avenue that we should explore? Before we make any decisions, it may be helpful to examine some of the factors surrounding the issue.

People assume that this National Convention is a new constitutional drafting process launched by Prime Minister Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, when he announced the 7-point Road Map to democracy in August 2003. The Convention is actually a continuation of the one convened in 1993. It was adjourned in 1996 and reconvened in May 2004 after an interval of almost 8 years. The Burmese military has, from the very beginning, clearly stated that one of the six key objectives for drafting the constitution is to legitimize the ‘political leadership role’ of the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces). But some have argued that since the constitution only reserves 25% of the legislative seats for the Tatmadaw, the new constitution is a good deal. After all, the military today controls 100% of the seats. While this may sound reasonable, it should be noted that the Convention has not said anything yet about how elections will be held.

Under the 1974 military-sponsored ‘Socialist’ constitution, all candidates had to be first approved by the ruling party. Therefore, the Tatmadaw could still control 100% of the seats while reserving only 25% of the seats for the military. In any case, the key issue is not the percentage of seats. Under the new presidential constitution, the powerful president must have 10 years of military experience. And to make doubly sure that the military retains control, the constitution also stipulates that the Commander-in-Chief will appoint three key ministers - including his own boss, the Defence Minister, the Home Minister, and the Minister for Border Affairs. The Commander-in-Chief also has the right to seize power any time he feels that national security is threatened. The Tatmadaw is also above the constitution. Can such a constitution lead to democracy?

Another factor that troubles democracy advocates is that delegates to the National Convention are prohibited from criticizing the constitution whether within the formal proceedings or informally outside the sessions. The proceedings are a state secret. Those who ignore the edicts have been harassed and arrested. One was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Law No.5/96 also makes it illegal for anyone to discuss the constitution outside the National Convention. If the new constitution is intended to bring democracy to Burma, why should it be a crime to discuss it openly? But some continue to argue that in spite of the totally undemocratic outcome, we should engage the military. They say that we should use the process to create some political space.

The way the Convention and the Road Map came to be launched may be instructive. The process to legitimize military rule actually started in November 1989 when Foreign Minister U Ohn Kyaw announced at the United Nations General Assembly in New York in November 1989 that Burma would hold general elections in 1990 to elect a new government. Senior-General Saw Maung, the Chair of SLORC, promised that he would hand over power to the election winners. But when the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, actually won 82% of the parliamentary seats, SLORC changed its tune and said that the elections were not to elect a government but only to determine who would draft a new constitution. After 3 years of maneuvering, the military again changed the rules and did not allow the 482 elected representatives to draft a new constitution. They instead hand-picked 702 delegates. Of this number only 107 elected representatives were selected.

When the NLD protested against the undemocratic practices within the Convention and walked out, the process stopped without any reason being given. When the National Convention finally reconvened in 2004, the ethnic cease-fire armies did exactly as is being suggested. They tried to use the process to create some political space. They requested that the 104 articles adopted in 1996 be reviewed given the 8-year gap, that the process be inclusive, and democratic. The results? Ethnic nationalities leaders were arrested and recently sentenced to over 100 years in prison each on unspecified charges.

And the military recently stated that the cease-fire armies represent only a small portion of the wider ‘national races’, and that their views would not be reflected in the constitution. This is because when the military reconvened the National Convention, they changed its composition. Instead of the 215 delegates from the ‘national races’ as in 1993, this was expanded to 633 delegates to minimize any possible negative effects from inviting the 105 delegates from the ethnic cease-fire armies to participate in the Convention. There are also now only 13 elected representatives left in an expanded Convention of 1,086 delegates. The military is also now claiming that there are no cease-fires armies. They claim instead that insurgents have re-entered the legal fold and some have even exchanged their arms for peace. This actually contradicts the military’s former claim that they have achieved peace in Burma because they have cease-fire agreements with 17 groups.

The above shows that the Burmese military will not compromise. To them, they are engaged in a process of national salvation, and they have to win at all costs. They will change the rules, stop the process, stack the cards, and re-define the situation in short, do anything, in order to win. Given such a rigid military mind-set, it is difficult to see how the National Convention process can be used to bring about democracy. But does this mean that there is no way out? For how many more years will the military keep shifting the goal posts? For how many more years will democracy advocates and the international community keep saying no? And for how many years will Burma continue to survive as a sovereign nation with its territorial integrity intact? The British government earlier this year identified Burma as a country at risk of instability. The United Nations Resident Coordinator in Yangon warned recently that worsening economic conditions and rising rates of disease including HIV-AIDS could eventually lead to a humanitarian crisis. Given this bleak prospect, perhaps the upcoming visit by the proposed ASEAN envoy can broker a deal.

The two contentious and seemingly contradictory objectives out of the six objectives proposed by the military are: the flourishing of a genuine multi-party democracy, and the Tatmadaw’s national political leadership role in the future state. But these objectives could be reconciled if the democracy movement were able to accept that the military needs to play a leading political role in a transition to democracy. The Tatmadaw must also accept that after a transition, the role of the Tatmadaw in politics must decrease if democracy is to flourish. According to the military’s plans, future sessions of the National Convention will be considering provisions to amend the constitution, and ‘prescriptions in the Transitional Period’. This could be the key to finding a solution. What is crucial now is for the Tatmadaw to agree to ASEAN’s involvement in the process of democratization in Burma and a definite time-frame. If such firm provisions guaranteed by ASEAN could be worked out, the democracy movement and the international community would welcome them.