Eighteen years has been passed by, the attempt to eliminate the totalitarianism from the soil of Burma is in the dim of success. The political situation of Burma continues to deteriorate. A regime incompetent in every aspect of government is efficient in just one department – the administration of brutality. Numerous reports had made clear that Burma is ruled by one of the world most brutal authoritarians. Its record includes: rape as a weapon of war against ethnic women; forcing millions into slave labor, described by the International Labor Organization (ILO) as a “crime against humanity”; the detention of more than 1,300 political prisoners, many of whom are routinely tortured; between 600,000 and one million internally displaced people forced from their lands; and the conscription of more child soldiers than any other country in the world. Regarding these violations, many UN Secretary General’s special representatives have visited Burma to find out peaceful solution on internal turmoil. However, all the diplomacy attempts of United Nations were unsuccessful. Ignoring UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s request for democratic transition in Burma by 2006, the junta is continue to violate above mentions human rights. Recently, Burmese democracy activists have pointed out that the situation of Burma represents a threat not only to the people of Burma , but also to the international peace and security and thus, the United Nations Security Council has an obligation to pass a peaceful resolution. Although, the regime in Burma has clearly demonstrated their unwillingness to engage in genuine negotiations and democratization process as requested by the diplomats from the United Nations, United Nations Security Council fails to pass the binding resolution against Burma . Undoubtedly, peaceful transition is hopeless for the democratization; the only alternative is armed revolution. But the armed revolution is easier said than done. Thus, before starting the armed struggle, understanding the type of enemy and the nature of armed revolution is not worthless, and would provide the valuable initiative for the struggle. It is worthy to know how many kinds of authoritarians have been developed and practiced in human history because differently structured authoritarian regimes would respond to the revolutionary situation differently. On the topic of dictatorship, most of the political scholars generally differentiate two categories of authoritarianisms, neopatrimonial dictatorship and institutional or corporative dictatorship.  

Neopatrimonial dictatorship could be distinguished from institutional form of authoritarianism along a number of structural appearances. Neopatrimonial dictatorship refers to a type of personalistic domination based on the compulsion and threats of the dictator’s army. The distribution of patronage and offices were given due to political loyalty. This type of dictatorship commonly used the method of carrot and stick. Fear and personal loyalties are the mainstays of a personalistic government. However, institutional form of authoritarianism tends to be more classically bureaucratic, with state institutions characterized by a single hierarchy of offices with more strictly delimited official responsibilities. Under institutional form of authoritarianism, appointments, promotions, and contracts are generally awarded according to expertise, training, or at least upon perceived loyalty to the institution of the army, the ruling party, or the state as a whole. The administrative and military officials of neopatrimonial dictatorship also tend to be more isolated from the broader political and intellectual currents of civil society than more bureaucratically organized officials and offices of institutional authoritarianism. More bureaucratically organized officials have somewhat more criterion, autonomy and capacity to associate with actors in civil society and or agents of foreign powers. Economic elites are also largely tolerated and even embraced institutional forms of military domination.

Perhaps, due to the infrastructural weakness of neopatrimonial totalitarianism a political scholar Jeff Goodwin said, “I believe that neopatrimonial dictatorships are comparatively more vulnerable to overthrew by revolutionaries than institutional form of authoritarianisms.” (Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. (p. 183.)) At this juncture, it is important to choose what kind of revolution are we going to launch? What kind of theory or strategy are we going to apply in overthrowing the totalitarianism, armed struggle or nonviolence? A political scholar Wilber A. Chaffee stated that “either electoral or violent competition is based on leader’s choice”, but many have argued his theory. Armed revolution or guerrilla movement is not a choice; it is a situational demand and emerged only when other means of political competitions and participations are rejected by the dominant military. Unwillingness of dictators’ motivation to bargain with oppositions, persistently denying real political participation to new contenders and increasingly archaic way of pounding any institutional share of power even to respectable opposition parties created radicalism among frustrated politicians and intellectual arena. Wilber said, “Violence will be shown to be the dominant strategy of political competitors, making revolution the normal method of replacing political leadership. Electoral democracy is found to be a much more complicated system of competition and therefore most in need of explanation.” (Chaffee, A. Wilber. 1984. “The Political Economy of Revolution and Democracy: Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 43, Issue 4.). To argue the Chaffee’s statement, Cuba revolution was a good example. The revolutionary hero, Fidel Castro, a law school graduate was a “candidate of the Orthodox Party” (U.S. -Cuba History) and supposed to run for Congress, but frustrated by the dictatorial regime. If a government has come to power through election, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted. When the forces of oppression come to power against established law, peace is considered as broken. In these conditions, an attitude of resistance finally crystallizes in an outbreak of fighting, provoked initially by the conducts of the totalitarianism. Under this kind of situation, nonviolent strategies could not be applied but armed struggle, since the nature of the dictators would never negotiate by political means.

While applying the nonviolent strategies in nation wide revolution, it is very important to consider the effects and side-effects, and the nature of nonviolent movement seriously. Nonviolent strategy is meant merely for specific movements but not for a revolution as a whole. It could success in the diminutive movements and particular demands like equal rights, equal opportunity, minority rights, religious rights, women rights, labor rights, etc. If the demand of the movement is to change the political system or entire government, there is no evident of successful nonviolent movement under any form of dictatorial regimes in the world history. The most important thing to be aware of is nonviolent strategy creates general lawlessness in broad and long term nationwide struggle under totalitarianism and it is axiom. Suppose, people from all walks of life, every people from every corner of the country participated in the movement, the administrative mechanism of entire country broke down unavoidably. When necessary mechanisms for instance transportation, communication, law and order were broke down, the country would be in jeopardy. Obviously, if the transportation is not functioning, stocks of food run out, the commodities and daily goods’ prices go up. Finally, starvation took place among the people and thus, general lawlessness such as robbery, burglary, murders, etc. usually follow. In the same way, luck of communication creates the movement uncontrollable since neither leaders from different parts of the country nor between leaders and demonstrators able to connect each others. Contrarily, this general lawlessness situation offers a respectable opportunity to military government to regain power by using its’ armed forces under the name of restoring law and order in the country. It is axiomatic to Burmese people in 8. 8. 88 nationwide uprising. Consequently, the armed struggle or guerrilla movement is the only tactic left for the revolutionaries to overthrow the military junta. There is no alternative choice or option. In response to a closed political system, guerrilla movement is the only functional alternative.

As a matter of fact, before initiating “functional alternative”, it is valuable to study political scholar Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley’ s theory. He stated that “the collective strength of government or rebel armed forces depends on external support, internal financing, and the internal solidarity of fighting forces.”(Wickham- Crowley, P. Timothy. “Winners, Losers, and Also- Rans: Toward Comparative Sociology of Latin American Guerilla Movement,” Power and Popular Protest, p. 160.) As Wickham-Crowley affirmed, the external support always plays a vital role in armed struggle because most guerrilla movements were organized and led by university students and professors, and its’ usually appeared as an alliance between intellectual leadership and grassroots level people. Thus, internal financing is almost impossible in newly established guerrilla organization. The middle class’s financial healthiness is also not strong enough to support the movement since the country economy usually ruin under dictatorial rule. On the other hand, the compulsory requirement of the armed struggle is to train guerrillas in the remote area where natural enemies such as malaria, dysentery, and other diseases are ordinarily predominated. Hence, protecting predominate enemies and training guerrillas, material and technical support from outside is essential. Another factor of internal solidarity is also critical element in the military outcomes of guerrilla warfare because government military forces are generally harmony and show a high degree of loyalty to government. In fact, guerrilla solidarity often broke down at the organizational level and continued splintering off from the main command, with allegations of heresy on distribution of rations, ammunitions and etc. This often occurs when the financial weakness taken place. Therefore, the root of internal solidarity is also depending on the material healthiness and external support. Nevertheless, internal solidarity is necessary, but not sufficient condition for ultimate success. Wickham-Crowley said “(t)hose that seize power must meet two other conditions; they must be militarily strong enough to confront the government armed forces; and they must strip the incumbent government of moral authority and cloak their own movement with that aura, shifting the loyalties of the nonpeasant population to their movement.” (Wickham-Crowley 1998; 143) Urban-rural linkages are agglomeration and vital for the continuation and growth of the aggrandized forces, but luck of this connection or inadequate agglomeration led to the guerrillas’ decline. Strong and continuous grassroots level support intended for maintenance of sufficient military strength to endure army attacks and to sustain a more general offensive. The obligation of urban forces is lobbying for stripping the incumbent government of all legitimacy and replacing it with own movement as the legitimate in the judgment of the populace. Shifting the mass loyalties from the government to the guerrilla group is not easier said than done because the practice of inflexibility and wrong-headedness of government gradually took the wind from their sails. In response, the revolutionary opposition secured multi institutional allies and leading to a final scenario in which a nation eliminate the authoritarianism.

However, revolutionary movements failed to conquer state power if the authoritarian regime is more institutional or corporative form of authoritarianism. As mentioned above, institutional form of totalitarianism has more bureaucratically organized officials and somewhat more criterion. Therefore, under institutional form of military regime, the revolutionary movements are unable to seize power from well armed and well organized regime even thought the movements have met all the requirements for the success. The regime also incapable of demolishing guerrillas backed up by the civilians. Eventually, after many years of struggle both sides found themselves locked into a stalemated civil war and usually accept negotiated settlements which offer elections, political openings, and reforms or formation of hybrid regime. At this point, revolutionary has to make extremely careful move since all forms of dictatorial regimes are not reliable. It is not a win-win situation or non zero sum. So-called election may only mean for defusing unsuccessful war and disabling the armed opposition. Typical consequence of a so-called election could shrink the revolutionary movement into party politics. For instance, the junta proclaims amnesty and regulates deceptive multi-parties election and thus, armed revolutionaries normally shape up electoral oriented political parties and split away from the main organization. Moreover, dictators use the fraud electoral process as a method of grabbing away the external support from the opposition. The atmosphere of the election would pull out the external attention from guerrillas to government. If international concentration moves from guerrillas to the electoral reform held by the regime, their supply to the guerrillas would be less in particular. While the international supports are becoming less, the guerrilla groups are gradually collapsed. Some time, it is the best and easiest way to cut off international support and supply to the armed struggle groups. Therefore, revolutionaries with the vigilant eyes must not abandon weapon in any circumstances and fortify forces must be on high alert especially in election period.

Again, external involvement plays a crucial role in electoral process. Without international involvement or arbitration, the regime could always deceive and manipulate the electoral process as the supreme power of the country is still in their hand. Therefore, revolutionaries become frustrated by repeated electoral fraud and political repression. As a matter of fact, the dictators who lost in the battle also faced nemesis. Consequently, dictators always protect their position just for not to become own grave diggers. Therefore, to summarize the preceding analyses and arguments for abolishing the authoritarianism, international involvement and support is essential not only in armed struggle but also in the peaceful transition of democracy; armed struggle is unavoidable under any form of totalitarianisms; an alternative legitimacy is necessary to accentuate illegality of the government and to get support from the forces of urban-rural linkages.

 

References

Chaffee, A. Wilber. 1984. “The Political Economy of Revolution and Democracy: Toward a Theory of Latin Amerincan Politics.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Volume 43, Issue 4.

Wickham-Crowley, P. Timothy. “Winners, Losers, and Also- Rans: Toward Comparative Sociology of Latin American Guerilla Movement,” Power and Popular Protest.

Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dolgoff, Sam. The Cuban Revolution: A Critical Perspective.

http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bright/dolgoff/cubanrevolution/toc.html

National Bipartisan Commission on Cuba. “U.S – Cuba History.”

http://www.uscubacommission.org/history3.html

Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/

Amnesty International. http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/mmr-summary-eng