Russia-Burma Nuclear Intelligence Report
1. Russia-Burma Nuclear Intelligence Report (June 2008)
2. Russia, Burma Discuss Joint Nuclear Project, But Deal Not Yet Done (June 2007)
3. Suspicion Hardens over Burma’s Nuclear Ambitions (may 2007)
Russia-Burma Nuclear Intelligence Report
By Roland Watson
June 26, 2008
We have new, disturbing, and detailed intelligence about the assistance Russia is providing Burma’s dictatorship, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), on its nuclear program and more generally its military modernization. This new information both confirms earlier intelligence that we have published, and expands what is known about the overall program.
Nuclear reactor and uranium mining
It has been widely reported that Russia is going to provide Burma a nuclear reactor, for so-called “research” purposes. We have received information that the SPDC has now purchased the 10 MW reactor. It is not new, but is reportedly in good condition. It is being dismantled, transported to Burma, and rebuilt. While we cannot confirm that it has arrived, our sources say that installation is due to be completed by December this year. (We have previously reported that North Korean technicians will assist with the construction.)
The reactor will be built at a site some ten kilometers from Kyauk Pa Toe, in Tha Beik Kyin township, approximately one hundred kilometers north of Mandalay near the Irrawaddy River.
In return for the reactor and other services, a Russian government mining company has received concessions to mine gold, titanium and uranium. There are two gold mining sites: in Kyauk Pa Toe; and in the mountains to the right of the Thazi-Shwe Nyaung railway line from Mandalay Division to Southern Shan State in the Pyin Nyaung area.
Titanium is also being mined, or derived from the same ore, at Kyauk Pa Toe.
Uranium is being mined at three locations: in the Pegu-Yoma mountain range in Pauk Kaung Township of Prome District (aka Pyi); in the Paing Ngort area in Mo Meik Township in Shan State; and at Kyauk Pa Toe.
The reactor site has been chosen because of its proximity to the Tha Beik Kyin and Mo Meik uranium mines. It is likely that the gold mining operation at the former will be used as cover, to conceal the nuclear facilities.
We have previously reported, from different sources, that the SPDC has a yellowcake mill somewhere in the Tha Beik Kyin area. Now we know the exact location (or at least enough information to find it with satellite imagery).
The reactor has been publicized as being for research purposes, meaning research on nuclear power generation. We believe that the SPDC has no real interest in generating electricity, or at best that this is a secondary consideration, and that the primary purpose is atomic weapons development. Our sources say that the SPDC expects to have full nuclear capability within ten years.
Russia is presumably supplying the reactor fuel as well. While Burma has uranium ore, and mills to convert it to yellowcake, this must be enriched to create the fuel, typically using cascades of gas centrifuges. We have received one report that the SPDC has begun a centrifuge program, at the South Nawin Dam, but this is unconfirmed. Barring this operation, the source of the fuel therefore must be Russia.
Note: Locating the reactor at Kyauk Pa Toe really only makes sense if there are plans to build an enrichment facility there. This way you would have the full industrial cycle in close proximity: mine, mill, enrichment, and reactor.
What is perhaps most disturbing about Russia’s program with the SPDC is that it is identical to the Soviet Union’s assistance that propelled North Korea to become a nuclear power. Why, with the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, is Russia still helping rogue regimes proliferate? The surface answer of course is money, in this case in the form of natural resources, but the deeper question remains. Russia is considered to be a democracy. What would the people of the country think of their leaders giving such help to the likes of the SPDC and Than Shwe?
In 1965, the Soviet Union gave North Korea a 2 MW reactor, which was upgraded in 1973 to 8 MW. It also supplied fuel through at least this period. North Korea then went on to construct a much larger reactor, and in the 1980s began weapons development. This included building separation facilities to obtain plutonium, and high explosives detonation tests. (We have received reports that the SPDC has already conducted such tests, in the Setkhya Mountains southeast of Mandalay.) At some point North Korea also began its own uranium enrichment program, to produce weapons grade material, and the U.S. confronted the country about this in 2002. This means that the North has two different sources of fissile material for weapons, reactor plutonium and enriched uranium.
The North detonated a small atomic weapon, with a yield of less than one kiloton, in October 2006, using some of its plutonium. It is now reportedly about to disclose its nuclear assets, and also destroy its plutonium producing reactor, but the sticking point has been the enriched uranium. The North appears unwilling to discuss this (and at this point to disclose its weapons cache), which means that even with the destruction of the reactor and the plutonium stockpile (for the latter the size of which is subject to serious dispute), the North would retain the ability to produce weapons with the uranium. At the moment the U.S. appears willing to accept partial disclosure, i.e., of only the plutonium.
In addition to Russia, North Korean technicians have been helping Burma with its nuclear ambitions (and other weapons programs), and we have received information that the SPDC has given the North refined uranium in return, which may be destined for the enrichment program.
This is all very disturbing, all the more so because of the apparent weakness of the Bush Administration, which has been unwilling to press the North, and which refuses even to mention Burma (its nuclear program). It took North Korea forty years before it detonated a weapon. It will likely take the SPDC only a fraction of this period. Once the Burmese junta has atomic weapons, its rule will be entrenched, and its neighbors, foremost Thailand, will be seriously endangered.
Precision-guided munitions
We have also previously reported that Burma has a wide variety of missile installations, including large quantities of land-based SAMs; ship-launched missiles, both surface to air and surface to surface; weapons for its MIG 29s; and even short range ballistic missiles. We have now received information that while Burma formerly bought anti-aircraft weapons from the Ukraine, in 2007 it purchased four shiploads of such weapons from Russia. We have also learned that the SPDC has multi-tube mechanized rocket launchers from North Korea. (Note: these may be for use with the ballistic missiles, and if so they confirm our earlier intelligence.)
Moreover, Burma is researching the production of guided missiles, and with Russian assistance intends to build a rocket factory in Thazi Township. This will mark the latest step in a well-recognized proliferation of Russian precision-guided munitions in the Asia Pacific region. This class of weapons includes surface to air, to attack jets, and surface to surface to attack land-based targets and also ships. Cruise missiles fall within the category. We do not know which specific PGMs the factory intends to produce, only that they will be medium range guided rockets and that production is scheduled to begin within five years.
It is clear that the SPDC is intent on developing a strong defense against an international intervention, including foreign jets, helicopters and ships. Perhaps one reason why the U.S. and the French balked at dropping relief supplies following Cyclone Nargis was the risk of missile attack on their helicopters and ships.
Military modernization
We have previously noted that the Burma Army is weapons-deficient. It is clear that the extensive procurement program underway with Russia, as well as China, North Korea and others, is intended to rectify this. During the era of Ne Win and the BSPP (Burma Socialist Program Party), the junta established six weapons production facilities. There are now twenty-two, and clearly more are planned.
Coupled with the materiel acquisitions is a major educational program. There are more than 5,000 State Scholars in Russia, all of whom passed their Defense Services Academy class, a nine-month program in the Russian language, and an entrance exam in their specialty. (This is an increase from the 3,000 we previously reported.) They are candidates for either a masters (2 years) or doctorate (4 years – we previously reported 3 years for this degree). They study in Moscow or St. Petersburg, in the former in a suburb at the Moscow Air Institute. There are additional State Scholars from Burma in China, North Korea, Pakistan and India.
One of the more recent groups of scholars, Batch Seven, included 1,100 DSA officers. Their majors are as follows:
250 Nuclear science
100 Tunneling science
200 Rockets
100 Electronics
200 Computer science
100 Aircraft construction
150 Artillery
The students also learn other military subjects, including: tanks; maintenance; anti-aircraft training; ammunition production; fighter pilot training; naval craft construction; naval craft captaincy; and anti-terrorist training.
While it is clear that the overall modernization program will improve the SPDC’s preparedness against attack, the junta still has a significant problem with soldier morale. Many of the state scholars, who are an elite in the Tatmadaw, are not motivated and would seek asylum given the chance. Their stipends barely cover their expenses. The Russian language and their training programs are difficult. They are overworked and separated from the civilian population. Their visas prohibit them from buying air, train or long-distance bus tickets. When they return to Burma, some are used as Russian language teachers or as instructors at the SPDC’s Central Research and Training Unit, but many are sent to the front lines.
As an example, in January this year one scholar fled to the border of Finland, but was arrested by Russian intelligence agents when he used his cell phone to call his contact on the other side. There is widespread dissatisfaction at all levels within the SPDC, except perhaps the very top – although there is reportedly a split there as well, between Than Shwe and Maung Aye. While the new weapons systems improve the junta’s defense against an intervention, they still need operators. The SPDC is poised to fall, through an internal coup, and it is subject to a renewed popular uprising as well.
Acquiring a nuclear weapon would alter this equation somewhat, but really only by creating a new defense against an intervention, and this is as yet some years away, unless the SPDC acquires a warhead directly from North Korea. Still, any such development has to be prevented, which raises the question, yet again: what is the U.S. doing? Under geopolitical realism, the only concerns are national interests. On a superficial level, for the U.S. and Burma, these are limited to Chevron’s investment in Burma’s natural gas production and pipelines. A secondary interest is the concern of U.S. citizens of Burmese origin, but since this group is small it can effectively be ignored. It would seem, therefore, that all the Administration bluster notwithstanding, its only real policy objective for Burma is to protect Chevron, which corporation to bolster its case also makes large campaign donations.
The real direct national interest of the United States is to deny Burma nuclear weapons. It is not only North Korea, Iran and Syria that America (and the world) must contain. Having a nuclear-armed SPDC is an unacceptable risk. This trumps the need to assist a domestic corporation. Further, since Chevron is also a major cash source for the junta, which uses money as well as the direct transfer of natural resources to pay its weapons suppliers, it demands that the company be forced to divest.
http://www.dictatorwatch.org/articles/russianintel.html
Russia, Burma Discuss Joint Nuclear Project, But Deal Not Yet Done
Graham Lees | Bio | 08 Jun 2007
World Politics Review Exclusive
Russia has put a price tag of half a billion dollars on plans to build a nuclear "research" center in Burma, one of the world's poorest countries, where electricity is a luxury for most inhabitants.
Rangoon's new diplomatic friend North Korea set a precedent for a destitute country managing to find the means to develop nuclear capabilities. But many Burma watchers take the view that on the issue of nuclear power there is little comparison between the North Korean and Burmese regimes.
The former is run by a dynastic demagogue, while the latter is controlled by self-enriching generals who rarely dip into their pockets to pay for anything.
Given the cost estimate put forward by Atomstroieksport -- the agency that handles Russia's overseas nuclear technology business deals -- and the need to find and fund the training of at least 300 Burmese scientists and technicians to help run it, Western diplomatic circles in Southeast Asia are beginning to take informal bets on whether the penny-pinching junta will ever actually proceed with the development.
The Russians have said a nuclear center -- ostensibly for medical and agricultural research -- would be powered by a 10-megawatt light-water research reactor fuelled by 20 percent enriched uranium 235.
Before the Russians appeared on the scene, there had been occasional speculation that North Korea was secretly trading nuclear technology to the Burmese regime, although nothing has ever been proven.
Suspicion refocused on possible North Korean involvement following two mysterious visits to Burma by North Korean ships recently, the last one docking in late May. Both vessels were claimed by the Burmese authorities to have sought port refuge from storms and to have been searched according to a U.N. Security Council resolution following Pyongyang's nuclear tests last October.
Few observers believe the storm refuge story.
North Korea and Burma resumed diplomatic relations only in April, although North Korean technicians have been seen in the country for several years.
On the wilder shores of unverifiable claims, a Burmese exile-run news agency, Burma News International, has just published an interview with a Burmese army officer recently returned from Russia who claims the junta is seriously interested in acquiring nuclear weapons -- primarily to spook its historic adversary but now main trading partner Thailand.
However, despite the nail-biting anxiety in some quarters over the proposed Russia-Burma nuclear cooperation, not only is it not yet a done deal, it would take at least five years to materialize even if it was, says Atomstroieksport.
The agreement reached in May between the Burmese regime and the Russian Federal Agency for Nuclear Energy, known as Rosatom, was merely an outline proposal. The two sides still have to sit down some time before the end of this year to agree on specific plans and timetables.
"The generals are very good at getting other people to pay," said Collin Reynolds, a Bangkok commodities analyst.
"Take Burma's rich natural gas resource as an example: it's now the country's biggest source of income but the junta has managed to get foreigners to pay to find it and pipe it."
The ruling Burmese generals are not only extraordinarily fickle -- prone to superstition and following soothsayer advice, which has them changing their minds on a whim -- many of them have been sick of late.
Five senior military chiefs have been in the hospital in Singapore for treatment in recent months.
Unofficial reports say two top junta men, Prime Minister Soe Win, and Shwe Mann, the general who is rumored to be in line to take over as paramount leader from the sickly Than Shwe, are both being treated in the city-state for serious disorders.
"If Burma's leaders continue their secret trips to Singapore for the treatment of undisclosed ailments, rumor and speculation are bound to increase," said Aung Zaw, an exiled Burmese and editor of The Irrawaddy magazine. "Talk will ultimately turn to a reshuffle within the military's top ranks."
Some Western diplomats in Southeast Asia think that the new expansionist Russia of President Vladimir Putin sees in the Rangoon regime a convenient means to gain an influential foothold in a region that is increasingly dominated economically and politically by China.
After Moscow's offer to help develop nuclear research in Burma, Russian companies have acquired licenses to prospect for gas and oil in the country. Just last month, two companies linked with the obscure Russian republic of Kalmykia began drilling onshore in Burma's remote northwest.
Most industry analysts consider the drilling a sop to the Burmese, but the timing could not have been better. Both India and South Korea, major investors in Burmese offshore gas, are bickering with the generals over rumored plans to sell China several trillion cubic feet of gas they have found and are producing.
Gas earned $2.16 billion of the $5 billion in export income claimed for Burma by the regime for the 2006-7 fiscal year to March.
Both China and India have been competing to supply armaments to the Burmese military, with the gas in mind.
"It boils down to whether the Russians see sufficient strategic benefit in establishing a significant presence in Burma. They certainly don't need Burma's oil and gas," said one Western diplomat in Bangkok, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
"If the junta is too difficult, the Russians will look elsewhere. Don't forget they have recently sold sophisticated warplanes to neighboring Malaysia."
India has recent experience of the Burmese junta crying poverty and getting someone else to foot the bill. The two countries are supposed to be jointly redeveloping Burma's western port of Sittwe, which was a seaside resort in the British colonial era.
Burma was due to pay only 10 percent of the expected $100 million bill but, just as Indian contractors were preparing to move in, the generals claimed they had no money. New Delhi, desperate to open up the port as access via the River Kaladan to India's isolated northeastern states, quickly agreed to pick up the whole bill.
Likewise, India wants to "jointly" build road and railway links as part of its so-called Look East economic policy, but the Burmese regime says it is too poor to participate.
New Delhi has begun to show some impatience with Rangoon and hinted just last week that it might review its investment in Burma's gas resource development if the generals show too much favor to Beijing.
It's been largely overlooked that Russia was gearing up to build a nuclear research center in Burma in 2002, but the plan was abandoned because the Burmese generals said they couldn't afford it.
It remains to be seen whether Moscow's Southeast Asian strategy is important enough to warrant picking up the entire tab for a "joint" nuclear research center.
Graham Lees is a Bangkok-based British journalist and WPR's Asia contributing editor. He has worked in several countries in East Asia over the last ten years covering regional business and political affairs.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/Article.aspx?id=838
Suspicion Hardens over Burma’s Nuclear Ambitions (Article)
May 25, 2007
By Aung Zaw
Burma’s confirmation of plans to build a 10-megawatt nuclear reactor with the help of Russia’s federal atomic energy agency Rosatom is a wake-up call to the international community to pay more attention to the regime in Naypyidaw.
The regime, which faced international isolation and sanctions, claims that the planned nuclear reactor is to be built with a “peaceful purpose,” but that should be viewed with skepticism and not treated lightly.
Before commenting on the bizarre incident of a North Korean ship taking shelter from a storm by docking in Rangoon last week, amid talk of missile technology transfer and a “secret mission” to Burma, we should look at the history of the country’s keen interest in nuclear technology.
Burma’s interest in developing a nuclear research project and reactor dates back to the 1960s, when the late dictator Gen Ne Win authorized Burmese geologists and physicists to look for uranium in upper Burma and Kachin State. A government plane installed with uranium detection equipment combed areas in upper Burma, and promising deposits are believed to have been discovered. The finds were confirmed by geologists writing in Burmese language publications in the 1960s.
Some military documents also indicated that Japanese military research during World War II concluded that Korea and Burma had sufficient uranium to make an atomic bomb.
In early 1940, Gen Takeo Yasuda, director of the Aviation Technology Research Institute of the Imperial Japanese Army, directed his aide, Lt-Col Tatsusaburo Suzuki, to conduct research. Suzuki reported back to his boss in October 1940, saying Japan had access to sufficient uranium in Korea and Burma to make an atomic bomb.
This early research doesn’t indicate that Burma is in any position now to utilize its uranium for any but peaceful purposes, but the country has had its share of nutty professors and military leaders with dreams of establishing a “Fourth Burmese Empire.”
The spotlight falls here on Thein Oo Po Saw, a professor at Rangoon University’s Department of Physics who studied in Moscow in the 1970s and developed close ties with Russian nuclear experts. Later, he helped bring a number of Russian nuclear experts to Burma and developed the idea of a nuclear reactor in the mid-1990s.
Thein Oo Po Saw is retired now, but he’s still a senior member of the Myanmar Academy of Technicians and Scholars, and he continues to play a leading role in the regime-sponsored National Convention, which is drafting a new constitution. Interestingly, he and his intellectual group presented a suggestion in 2005 at the convention when delegates were discussing a chapter dealing with the defense of the Union of Myanmar [Burma].
The discussion included “conventional arms, ammunition and explosives and non-conventional sophisticated strategic arms” as well as “nuclear energy, nuclear fuel and radiation, and mineral resources that produce them, highly classified materials, objects, areas, technologies, researches and information and special security issues, accidents concerning the persons whose works involve highly classified materials, objects, areas, technologies, researches and information, and compensation and insurance cover for them in case of accidents,” according to official The New Light of Myanmar.
Another “nutty professor” behind the nuclear reactor project is U Thaung, Burma’s Minister for Science and Technology, who signed the reactor agreement in Moscow last week with his Russian counterpart Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of Russia’s atomic agency.
U Thaung attended Burma’s Defense Service Academy Intake (1) and was known as one of the brightest students in the class, with in-depth knowledge on Burma’s uranium. He served in successive Ne Win governments.
An extreme nationalist, Col U Thaung didn’t serve long in the army but was given an important position at the Ministry of Mines. He was director general of Burma's Department of Geological Survey and Mineral Exploration, a job he was given because of his extensive knowledge of uranium exploration in Burma.
He continued to serve under the current regime and was appointed Burma’s ambassador to the US. Recalled to Rangoon, he was given a ministerial post at the newly created Ministry of Science and Technology with instructions to deal with the Russians and begin the reactor project. He visited Moscow several times since 2000 in pursuit of the deal.
Long-existing plans to develop a research reactor had been interrupted by the 1988 national uprising, and former intelligence officers who worked under Gen Khin Nyunt told The Irrawaddy in 2006 that it wasn’t until 1996 that Burma’s Office of Strategic Studies, established with Gen Khin Nyunt’s blessing, reactivated the project.
The revival of the plans was unsurprising, and North Korean and Russian technicians and nuclear experts were invited to Burma to give advice.
U Thaung, who is close to Burma’s reclusive leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe, and Thein Oo Po Saw were back in business. Their aim was to build a strong and modern army by 2020 under a “Fourth Burmese Empire,” officials who are close to U Thaung told The Irrawaddy. The search for uranium in Burma intensified.
In the early 2000s, the regime confirmed publicly that uranium deposits had been found in five areas: Magwe, Taungdwingyi, Kyaukphygon and Paongpyin in Mogok, and Kyauksin. Residents of Thabeikkyin township, 60 miles north of Mandalay, said searches were underway in the area. The searches also extended to southern Tenasserim Division.
If one looked at these developments closely, it could be seen that serious preparations were underway.
In 2006, a new Nuclear Physics Department was launched in Rangoon and Mandalay universities, with students enrolled by the government.
Burma also sent several hundred students and army officers to Russia for nuclear research studies. About 300 Burmese military officers have reportedly been studying nuclear science in Russia.
Some students have returned home with their acquired knowledge, and U Thaung and his ministry officials might have thought it now had sufficient human resources to begin the reactor project.
The previous agreement with Moscow was reportedly called off in 2003 because of disputes over terms of payment. Than Shwe and his military leaders might now feel that cash is no longer a problem in view of Burma’s newly-discovered vast natural gas reserves.
Interestingly, Burma implemented the nuclear reactor project in the regime’s typically low key manner without arousing any international outcry or serious monitoring.
Former military intelligence officers who have seen classified documents claimed that the regime’s aim in developing a nuclear reactor is to arm the country with nuclear weapons. They say facilities have been prepared at Defense Industry No. 16 and No. 19, located in Prome, Pegu division.
Reports inside Burma say the reactor is to be built in Magwe, north of Prome, but the regime has not disclosed the exact location.
Burma’s development of its defense capability goes back to the early 1950s, when the country drew on German, Italian, Russian and Israeli assistance to give the country’s armed forces the muscle they needed to deal with insurgency and civil war.
Over the decades, Burma has built nearly 20 defense industries and factories in secure locations within and outside Rangoon. Arms factories manufactured conventional weapons, including automatic rifles, light machine guns and landmines. But two are believed to be involved in refining uranium¬ defense industries No.16 and No.19, established in Pauk Khaung in Prome, Ne Win’s birthplace, where he ordered the construction of the country’s second arms factory in the 1960s. This claim came from former intelligence officers and needs verification.
While it is hard to gauge Burma’s real nuclear ambitions, its shady relationship with North Korea has fuelled speculation and growing skepticism.
Last Sunday, a cargo ship from North Korea docked in Burma in what was believed to be the first port call by a North Korean ship since the two countries agreed last month to resume diplomatic relations. The Kang Nam I docked at Thilawa port, 30 km south of Rangoon, seeking shelter from a storm¬or so ran the official explanation for its presence.
By a strange coincidence, a North Korean cargo ship in distress anchored at a Burmese port last November, and the government reported that an on-board inspection had "found no suspicious material or military equipment." But journalists and embassies in Rangoon were skeptical.
Early last July, a dissident source told The Irrawaddy that a North Korean ship carrying a senior Korean nuclear technology expert, Maj Hon Kil Dong, arrived in Rangoon with a biological and nuclear package. Western analysts and intelligence sources quickly dismissed this report, however, but conceded it was possible that Burma would seek conventional arms and technology rather than high-tech long-rang missiles from Pyongyang.
Burma and North Korea last month resumed the diplomatic ties that had been broken in 1983 after a bomb attack in Rangoon by North Korean terrorists on a visiting South Korean delegation headed by then-President Chun Doo-hwan.
Clandestine contacts between the two countries were re-established several years ago as Burma stepped up its search for sources conventional weapons. But the question remains: why North Korea?
It is easy to speculate that Burma may be seeking nuclear technology from Pyongyang, although no solid evidence has emerged so far. It is legitimate, however, to raise the issue and to inquire into the regime’s intentions, in the interests of keeping nuclear technology out of the hands of irresponsible governments.
Although it is perhaps premature to conclude that Burma intends to undertake the complicated and perilous process of reprocessing uranium to get weapons-grade plutonium, as things stand at the moment, strong suspicions will continue to grow. In the US, for instance, officials have long been expressing concern about the likely transfer of nuclear technology to Burma from North Korea.
The go-ahead for the nuclear reactor project and the arrival of that North Korean ship are two developments that can hardly be coincidental. If the ship¬and the freighter that arrived last November¬carried not only conventional weapons but plutonium and processing materials to Burma, then it can indeed be suspected that Burma plans to skip the messy process of obtaining plutonium and move straight to the production of weapons.
The presence of such a suspicion presents a security concern for regional governments and the international community at large. Developments here have to be watched very closely indeed.
Burma’s Nuclear Ambition
Burma’s nuclear ambitions, spotlighted by last month’s announcement that Russia hsa agreed to help the regime build a nuclear research facility, date back at least seven years. In December 1995, the junta signed the Bangkok Treaty, banning the development, manufacture, possession, control, stationing, transport, testing or use of nuclear weapons under the terms of the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Five years later, after a visit to Moscow by Burma’s minister for science and technology, U Thaung, the junta’s nuclear plans became clearer.
TIMELINE
January 2002
The Burmese government confirms plans to build a nuclear research reactor “for peaceful purposes.”
May 2002
Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry, known as Minatom, agrees to help Burma build a nuclear studies center, to include a 10-megawatt nuclear reactor and two laboratories in Magwe Division, central Burma. The agreement includes the construction of facilities for disposing of nuclear waste and Russian training for Burmese technicians.
July 2002
Russia and Burma sign an agreement in Moscow on construction of the proposed nuclear research center in Burma.
April 9, 2004
Keith Luse, an aide to US Senator Richard Lugar, asks whether North Korea is providing nuclear technology to Burma during a Washington seminar organized by the Heritage Foundation, the conservative think-tank.
February 13, 2004
The Burmese government declares that it has “no desire” to develop nuclear weapons, but “has the right to develop nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes.”
September 14, 2004
About 400 young military officers from Burma leave for Russia, amid reports that some of them will study nuclear engineering.
August 3, 2006
Burma’s deputy ambassador to the UN Nyunt Swe tells the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that Burma is opposed to nuclear weapons.
May 15, 2007
Russia’s federal atomic energy agency Rosatom announces it will help Burma build the proposed nuclear facility. The agency says the 10-megawatt nuclear reactor, fueled by less than 20 percent uranium-235, will contribute to Burma’s “research in nuclear physics, bio-technology, material science as well as…produce a big variety of medicines.” A first round of talks on details of the project began and further discussions are scheduled for the second half of this year.
May 16, 2007
The US condemns the project, while Thailand says it has no worries because the facility will be closely supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
http://www.aungzaw.net/2007/Suspicion_Hardens_over_Burma_Nuclear_Ambitions.html
